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Recent empirical research ﬁnds that pairs of countries with stronger trade linkages tend to have more highly
correlated business cycles. We assess whether the standard international business cycle framework can
replicate this intuitive result. We employ a three-country model with transportation costs. We simulate
the eﬀects of increased goods market integration under two asset market structures: complete markets and
international ﬁnancial autarky. Our main ﬁnding is that under both asset market structures the model can
generate stronger correlations for pairs of countries that trade more, but the increased correlation falls far
short of the empirical ﬁndings. Even when we control for the fact that most country pairs are small with
respect to the rest of the world, the model continues to fall short. We also conduct additional simulations
that allow for increased trade with the third country or increased TFP shock comovement to aﬀect the
country pair’s business cycle comovement. These simulations are helpful in highlighting channels that could
narrow the gap between the empirical ﬁndings and the predictions of the model.
JEL Classiﬁcation code: F4
Keywords: international trade, international business cycle comovement1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Do countries that trade more with each other have more closely synchronized business cycles?
Yes, according to the conventional wisdom. Increased trade simply increases the magnitude of
the transmission of shocks between two countries. Although this wisdom has circulated widely
for a long time, it was not until recently that empirical research was undertaken to assess its
validity. Running cross-country or cross-region regressions, ﬁrst Frankel and Rose (FR, 1998),
and then, Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Otto, Voss, and Willard (2001), Calderon, Chong, and
Stein (2002), Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004), and others have all found that, among industrialized
countries, pairs of countries that trade more with each other exhibit a higher degree of business cycle
comovement.1 Using updated data, we re-estimate the FR regressions and ﬁnd that a doubling
of the median (across all country pairs) bilateral trade intensity is associated with an increase
in the country pair’s GDP correlation of about 0.06. These empirical results are all statistically
signiﬁcant, and they suggest that increased international trade may lead to a signiﬁcant increase
in output comovement.
While the results are in keeping with the conventional wisdom, it is important to interpret
them from the lens of a formal theoretical framework. The international real business cycle (RBC)
framework is a natural setting for this purpose because it is one of the workhorse frameworks
in international macroeconomics, and because it embodies the demand and supply side spillover
channels that many economists have in mind when they think about the eﬀect of increased trade
on comovement. For example, in the workhorse Backus, Kehoe, Kydland (BKK, 1994) model,
ﬁnal goods are produced by combining domestic and foreign intermediate goods. Consequently, an
increase in ﬁnal demand leads to an increase in demand for foreign intermediates.
The impact of international trade on the degree of business cycle comovement has yet to be
studied carefully with this framework, as FR note: “The large international real business cycle
literature, which does endogenize [output correlations]...does not focus on the eﬀects of changing
economic integration on...business cycle correlations.”2 The goal of this paper is to focus on these
eﬀects by assessing whether the international RBC framework is capable of replicating the strong
1Anderson, Kwark, and Vahid (1999) also ﬁnd that there is a positive association between trade volume and the
degree of business cycle synchronization. Canova and Dellas (1993) and Imbs (2004) ﬁnd that international trade
plays a relatively moderate role in transmitting business cycles across countries.
2FR, p. 1015-1016. While several papers (which we cite in fn. 12) have looked at the relationship between trade
and business cycle comovement, their focus was not on explaining the recent cross-sectional empirical research.
1empirical ﬁndings discussed above. We develop, calibrate, and simulate an international business
cycle model designed to address whether increased trade is associated with increased GDP comove-
ment. Our model extends the BKK model in three ways. First, recent research by Heathcote and
Perri (2002) shows that an international RBC model with no international ﬁnancial asset markets
(international ﬁnancial autarky) generates a closer ﬁt to several key business cycle moments than
does the model in a complete markets setting or a one-bond setting. Based on this work, in our
model we study settings with international ﬁnancial autarky, as well as complete markets. Second,
in the above empirical work, the authors recognize the endogeneity of trade and instrument for it.
In our framework, we introduce transportation costs as a way of introducing variation in trade.
Diﬀerent levels of transportation costs will translate into diﬀerent levels of trade with consequent
eﬀects on GDP comovement.
The typical international business cycle model is cast in a two-country setting. Indeed, in a
previous paper (Kose and Yi, 2001), we partially addressed the issue of this paper using a two-
country model. We argued that the model was able to explain about one-third to one-half of the
FR ﬁndings; our conclusion was that the model had failed to replicate these ﬁndings. However,
it turns out that this setting is inappropriate for capturing the empirical link between trade and
business cycle comovement. In particular, in a two-country setting, by deﬁnition, the (single)
pair of countries constitutes the entire world, and one country is always at least one-half of the
world economy. This would appear to grossly exaggerate the impact of a typical country on
another. In reality, a typical pair of countries is small compared to the rest of the world. Also,
a typical country pair trades much less with each other than it does with the rest of the world.
Moreover, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) carefully show theoretically and empirically that
bilateral trading relationships depend on each country’s trade barrier with the rest of the world.
Consequently, a more appropriate framework is one that captures the facts that pairs of countries
tend to be small relative to the rest of the world, pairs of countries trade much less with each
other than they do with the rest of the world, and bilateral trade patterns depend on trading
relationships with the rest of the world. These forces can only be captured in a setting with at
least three countries. This is our third, and most important, modiﬁcation of the BKK model.
Our three-country model is calibrated to be as close to our updated FR regressions as possible.
In particular, two of our countries are calibrated to two countries from the FR sample (the “country
pair”), and the third country is calibrated to the other 19 countries, taken together (the “rest of
the world”). We choose four country pairs, all of which are close to the median bilateral trade
2intensity and GDP correlation. We solve and simulate our model under a variety of transport costs
between the two small countries. Following the empirical research, we compute the change in GDP
correlation per unit change in the log of bilateral trade intensity. We ﬁnd that under either set of
market structures, the model can match the empirical ﬁndings qualitatively, but it falls far short
quantitatively. In our baseline experiment, the model explains at most 1/10 of the responsiveness
of GDP comovement to trade intensity found in our updated FR regressions.
A key reason for the model’s weak performance is that the trade intensity for each of our
benchmark country pairs is small to begin with. A typical country does not trade much with
any other country: the median trade intensity in our sample is 0.0023, or approximately 1/4 of
one percent of GDP. For trade intensities close to the median, a doubling or tripling is not a
large increase in level terms. Moreover, we perform simulations indicating that what matters for
the model is the change in trade intensity levels, not logs. Consequently, we re-estimate the FR
regressions using trade intensity levels. We also compute the responsiveness of GDP comovement
to trade intensity levels implied by our model and compare it to the new coeﬃcient estimates.
Now the model performs better. For the best benchmark country pair, the model implies that a
one-percentage-point increase in trade intensity (roughly 1 percent of GDP) would increase their
GDP correlation by about 0.036, which is more than 1/4 of the empirical ﬁndings. Nevertheless,
for the other country pairs the model continues to fall short by more than an order of magnitude.
While the model performs even better when we employ a lower Armington elasticity of substitu-
tion, there is still a suﬃcient gap between the model and the empirical ﬁndings that it is suggestive
of a trade-comovement puzzle. This puzzle would be distinct from the puzzles that Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (2001) document; in particular, it is diﬀerent from the consumption correlation puzzle. The
consumption correlation puzzle is about the inability of the standard international business cycle
models to generate the ranking of cross-country output and consumption correlations in the data.
Our trade-comovement puzzle is about the inability of these models to generate a strong change
in output correlations from changes in bilateral trade intensity. In other words, the consumption
correlation puzzle is about the levels and ranking of output and consumption correlations, while
the trade-comovement puzzle is about a “slope.”
We conduct two further experiments that might help explain the gap between the model and
the empirical ﬁndings. In one experiment, we vary all transport costs, not just those between
the country pair, but we attribute all of the correlation changes to changes in the country pair’s
bilateral trade. This experiment yields a slope that is closer to, and in some cases, exceeds, the
3empirically estimated slopes. We also ﬁnd that the empirical association between trade and total
factor productivity (TFP) comovement is almost as strong as the association between trade and
GDP comovement. We conduct an experiment in which as we vary transport costs and trade, the
correlation of TFP shocks changes in a way that is consistent with our regressions. Now there are
two channels aﬀecting GDP correlation: the pure trade channel and an indirect channel operating
through TFP comovement. Not surprisingly, the model does a much better job in this experiment.
Both of our experiments provide guidance for future empirical and modeling work on resolving this
puzzle.
In Section 2, we update the Frankel-Rose regressions to study the empirical relationship be-
tween trade and business cycle comovement. Next, we describe our three-country model and its
parameterization. Our quantitative assessment of the model is conducted in section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2 Empirical Link between Trade and Comovement
We update the Frankel-Rose (FR) regressions, which employed quarterly data running from 1959
to 1993. Our sample covers the same 21 OECD countries as in FR, but our data are annual and
cover the period 1970-2000. We employ one of the FR measures of bilateral trade intensity, the
sum of each country’s imports from the other divided by the sum of their GDPs, averaged over the
entire period. The median bilateral trade intensity (hereafter “trade intensity”) over all countries
and all years is 0.0023, and the standard deviation of the trade shares is 0.0098. We employ two
of the FR measures of business cycle comovement, Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁltered and (log) ﬁrst-
diﬀerenced correlations of real GDP between the two countries. Summary statistics of the trade
and comovement data are presented in Table 1a, and the data for HP-ﬁltered GDP are illustrated
in Figure 1. While the data look “cloudy,” there is also a fairly clear positive slope.3
We estimate two (cross-section) regressions. In the ﬁrst, we follow FR by running instrumental
variables (IV) estimation on the log of trade intensity:
Corrij = β0 + β1 ln(Tradeij)+ ij (1)
where i and j denote the two countries. In the second, we run the regression on the levels of
Tradeij:
Corrij = β0 + β1Tradeij +  ij (2)
3Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004) produce a similar ﬁgure using data from developed and developing countries.
4As mentioned in the introduction, the regressions using the log of trade intensity imply that an
increase in a country pair’s trade intensity from 0.002 to 0.004 is associated with the same change in
its GDP correlation as an increase in its trade intensity from 0.02 to 0.04. This would appear to be
counterfactual, which motivates our second regression, in which trade intensity is measured in level
terms. We employ a GMM instrumental variables estimator that corrects for heteroskedasticity in
the error terms. Our instruments for Tradeij are the same as in FR: a dummy variable for whether
the two countries are adjacent, a dummy variable for whether the two countries share a common
language, and the log of distance. The coeﬃcients on trade intensity are listed in Table 1b.
Our estimates are consistent with those in the empirical literature. In the logs regression, the
slope coeﬃcient estimate implies that a country pair with twice the trade intensity as another
country pair will have a 0.063 (HP-ﬁltered GDP) or 0.054 (log ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GDP) higher GDP
correlation, all else equal. FR’s estimates with HP-ﬁltered GDP imply that a doubling of trade
intensity is associated with a 0.033 higher GDP correlation. The slope coeﬃcient from our levels
regression implies that a doubling of the median trade intensity, i.e., an increase of 0.0023, is
associated with an increase in GDP correlation of about 0.029 (HP-ﬁltered GDP) or 0.026 (log
ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GDP). Note that these numbers are about half as large as what is implied from the
logs regression. We also examined two other measures of trade intensity, the sum of each country’s
imports from each other divided by the sum of their total imports, and bilateral imports divided
by total imports of the smaller of the two countries. The results are very similar to those obtained
with our benchmark measure of trade intensity.4
3 The Model
Our model extends the basic two-country, free trade, complete market BKK (1994) framework by
having three countries and transportation costs and by allowing for international ﬁnancial autarky
(zero international asset markets).5 We ﬁrst describe the preferences and technology. Then, we
4The motivation for the second measure comes from the idea that a high GDP correlation seems to arise from
a large bilateral trade share (of total trade) by the smaller of the two countries. For the ﬁrst measure and for the
HP-ﬁltered data (the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced results are very similar), a doubling of the median trade intensity is associated
with an increase in GDP correlation of 0.08 (logs) and 0.035 (levels). For the second measure, a doubling of the
median trade intensity is associated with an increase in GDP correlation of 0.08 (logs) and 0.051 (levels).
5Heathcote and Perri (2002) and Kose and Yi (2001) examine international ﬁnancial autarky; Backus, Kehoe,
Kydland (1992), Zimmermann (1997), Kose and Yi (2001) and Ravn and Mazzenga (1999), all examine the eﬀects of
transport costs; and Zimmermann (1997) employs a three-country model. To our knowledge, no previous paper has
5describe the characteristics of the asset markets. Unless stated otherwise, all variables denote own
country per capita quantities.
3.1 Preferences
In each of the three countries, there are representative agents who derive utility from consumption












, 0 <µ<1; 0 <β<1; 0 <γ ; i =1 ,2,3 (3)
where cit is consumption and nit is the amount of labor supplied in country i in period t. µ is the
share of consumption in intratemporal utility, and γ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Each agent has a ﬁxed time endowment normalized to 1.
3.2 Technology
There are two sectors in each country: a sector that produces a traded intermediate good and a
sector that produces a non-traded ﬁnal good. Each country is completely specialized in producing
an intermediate good. We suppress time subscripts except where necessary.
The Intermediate Goods Sector
Perfectly competitive ﬁrms in the intermediate goods sector produce traded goods according to
a Cobb-Douglas production function:
yi = zikθ
in1−θ
i , 0 <θ<1; i =1 ,2,3 (4)
where yi denotes (per capita) intermediate good production in country i; zi is the productivity
shock; ki is capital input. θ denotes capital’s share in output. Firms in this sector rent capital and
hire labor in order to maximize proﬁts, period by period:
max
ki,n i
piyi − riki − wini (5)
subject to ki,n i ≥ 0; i =1 ,2,3
where wi (ri) is the wage (rental rate), and pi is the f.o.b. or factory gate price of the intermediate
good produced in country i.
included all three features.




πjyij = πiyi (6)
where πi is the number of households in country i, and determines country size. yij denotes the
quantity of intermediates produced in country i and shipped to each agent in country j.





When the intermediate goods are exported to the other country, they are subject to transporta-
tion costs. We think of these costs as a stand-in for tariﬀs and other non-tariﬀ barriers, as well as
transport costs. Following BKK (1992) and Ravn and Mazzenga (1999), we model the costs as
quadratic iceberg costs. This formulation of transport costs generalizes the standard Samuelson
linear iceberg speciﬁcation and takes into account that transportation costs become higher as the
amount of traded goods gets larger. Speciﬁcally, if country i exports yij units to country j, gij(yij)2
units are lost in transit, where gij is the transport cost parameter for country i’s exports to country
j.T h a ti s ,o n l y :
(1 − gijyij)yij ≡ mij (8)
units are imported by country j. We think of gijyij as the iceberg transportation cost; it is the
fraction of the exported goods that are lost in transit. In our simulations, we evaluate the transport
costs at the steady state values of yij. Below, we discuss our transport technology further.
The Final Goods Sector
Each country’s output of intermediates is used as an input into ﬁnal goods production. Final
goods ﬁrms in each country produce their goods by combining domestic and foreign intermediates
via an Armington aggregator. To be more speciﬁc, the ﬁnal goods production function in country
















ω1j,ω 2j,ω 3j > 0; α > 0; j =1 ,2,3
7where ω1j denotes the Armington weight applied to the intermediate good produced by country
1 and imported by country j (m1j). We assume that gii =0and that gijyij = gjiyji. In other
words, there is no cost associated with intra-country trade, i.e., m22 = y22, and iceberg transport
costs between two countries do not depend on the origin of the goods. 1/α is the elasticity of
substitution between the inputs.










− p1jm1j − p2jm2j − p3jm3j (11)
where qj is the price of the ﬁnal good produced by country j,a n dpij is the c.i.f. (cost, insurance,
and freight) price of country i’s good imported by country j.N o t et h a tpjj = pj. The non-traded
good in country 1 is the numeraire good; hence, q1 =1 .
As in Ravn and Mazzenga (1999), we can use the ﬁrst order conditions from 11 to calculate the











Also, because ∂F/∂yij =( ∂F/∂mij)(1 − 2gijyij), we know that:
pi =( 1− 2gijyij)pij (13)
Comparing 8 and 13, it is easy to see that the c.i.f. price multiplied by imports exceeds the f.o.b.
price multiplied by exports:
pijmij − piyij = pij(1 − gijyij)yij − piyij = yij(pij(1 − gijyij) − pi) > 0 (14)
In other words, if we think of the transportation costs as arising from transportation services
provided to ship goods between countries, with the quadratic costs arising because the transporta-
tion “technology” is decreasing returns to scale, then, in a perfect competition setting, there are
positive proﬁts. That is, the ﬁrms providing the transportation services pay the exporting ﬁrm
the factory gate or f.o.b. price of the good, and then receive the c.i.f. price from the ﬁnal goods
ﬁrm in the importing country. We think of a single representative shipping ﬁrm that chooses yij to
maximize the leftmost expression of 14. We assume that households in the exporting country own
this ﬁrm, whose proﬁts are distributed as dividends to the households.
Capital is accumulated in the standard way:
kjt+1 =( 1− δ)kjt + xjt,j =1 ,2,3 (15)
8where xit is investment, and δ is the rate of depreciation. Final goods are used for domestic
consumption and investment in each country:
cjt + xjt = F(y1jt,y 2jt,y 3jt),j =1 ,2,3 (16)
3.3 Asset Markets
We consider two asset market structures, (international) ﬁnancial autarky and complete markets.
Under ﬁnancial autarky, there is no asset trade; hence, trade is balanced period by period. As
mentioned above, Heathcote and Perri (2002) have shown that international business cycle models
with ﬁnancial autarky yield a closer ﬁt to some key business cycle moments than the same models
under complete markets. Also, ﬁnancial autarky is the natural “othere x t r e m e ”r e l a t i v et oc o m p l e t e
markets.6 The following budget constraint must hold in each period:
qit(cit + xit) − ritkit − witnit − Rit =0 , ∀t =0 ,...,∞; i =1 ,2,3 (17)




(pijtmijt−pityijt). In addition to dividends, the household obtains income from its labor and
from the capital it owns. The household spends its income on consumption and investment goods.
The complete markets framework, i.e., complete contingent claims or fully integrated international















(ristkist + wistnist + Rist)
#
(18)
where the subscript s indexes the state of nature. Households maximize 3 subject to either 17
or 18.
3.4 Equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium is a sequence of goods and factor prices and quantities such that
the ﬁrst order conditions to the ﬁrms’ and households’ maximization problems, as well as market
clearing conditions 6 and 16, are satisﬁed in every period.
6A third asset structure that is popular involves one-period risk-free bonds. However, recent research by Heathcote
and Perri (2002), Baxter and Crucini (1995), and others suggests that, when productivity shocks are stationary, a
bond economy typically implies results very similar to those of a complete markets economy.
93.5 Calibration and Solution
Our goal is to quantitatively assess whether our three-country international RBC model can gen-
erate the high responsiveness of GDP comovement to bilateral trade intensity found in the data.
To tie our simulations as closely as possible to the empirical work in section 2, we view the world
as consisting of the 21 OECD countries in our sample. Two of the countries in our model are
calibrated to two of the OECD countries (the “country pair”), and the third country of our model
is calibrated to an aggregate of the other 19 countries (the “rest of the world” or “ROW”). There
are 210 such three-country combinations; we select four combinations to serve as our benchmarks.
We focus on country combinations whose bilateral trade intensity and GDP correlation are close to
the median values of these variables. For each bilateral country pair, we calculate the root mean
square error of its GDP correlation and trade intensity from their respective medians in the 210
country pair sample. We do this for both the HP-ﬁltered GDP and the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GDP.
Among the country pairs that are in the lowest 10 percent in root mean square error for both GDP
correlations, we pick the three country pairs with the smallest root mean square error. These are
Belgium and U.S.; Australia and Belgium; and Finland and Portugal. We also pick the country
pair among the G-7 countries that is closest to the median: France and the U.S.. Table 1c lists the
trade intensities and the GDP correlations for each of our benchmark country pairs.
Calibration
In our model, one period corresponds to one year. This maintains consistency with the empirical
estimation we presented earlier. Most of the parameters draw directly from or are the annualized
versions of those in BKK (1994). The share of consumption in the utility function is 0.34, which
implies that 30 percent of available time is devoted to labor activity. The coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion is 2. The preference discount factor is 0.96, which corresponds to an annual ingterest
rate of approximately 4 percent. The capital share in production is set to 0.36 and the (annual)
depreciation rate is 0.1. We also follow BKK (1994) and set the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods in the Armington aggregator at 1.5 (hereafter, “Armington elasticity”).
The two key elements of the calibration are the Armington aggregator weights ωij,a n dt h e
productivity shocks. For each set of three countries (the designated country pair and the rest of
the world), there are nine weights. The weights are set so that when all bilateral transport costs
are 15 percent, the model’s deterministic steady state implies import shares equal to the actual
import shares, and intermediate goods output equals ﬁnal goods output in each country. We use 15
10percent transport costs because the research of Baier and Bergstrand (2001), Hummels (2001), Yi
(2003), and others suggests that in the 1980s and 1990s, transport costs plus tariﬀsf o rd e v e l o p e d
countries were around 7 percent to 15 percent, and because we allow for unmeasured trade frictions,
such as border-crossing regulations, as well. We estimate the productivity shocks using the data of
the benchmark country pairs and the ROW. We begin by calculating Solow residuals using data
from the Penn World Tables version 6.0. For each benchmark country pair, we calculate Solow
residuals for the two countries, which we will think of as small, and for the aggregate of the other
19 countries (ROW). We do this for 1970 through 1998. With the Solow residuals, we estimate
an AR(1) shock process. Further details about the parameterization of the Armington aggregator
weights and the productivity shocks are given in the Appendix and in Appendix Table 1.
Solution
Because analytical solutions do not exist under either asset market structure, we solve the
model following the standard linearization approach in the international business cycle literature.
Under complete markets, the model is converted into the equivalent social planning problem and
solved accordingly. The social planning weights associated with the complete markets version of
the three-country model are solved for so that each country’s budget constraint is satisﬁed in the
steady state; the weights are close, but not equal, to the countries’ population weights. Under
ﬁnancial autarky, the optimization problems of the two types of ﬁrms, as well as of the households,
are solved, along with the equilibrium conditions.7














where p12 is country 1’s terms of trade with country 2 (the price of country 2’s good in terms
of country 1’s good).8 In the special case of three equally sized countries, and with symmetric
Armington weights, the trade intensity measure captures bilateral exports expressed as a share of
country 1’s (or country 2’s) GDP.
7In the complete market setting, the rebates associated with transports costs are subsumed in the social planning
problem. In the portfolio autarky setting, the rebates must be explicitly included for as given in equation 17.
8Following the convention of BKK (1994) we deﬁn et h et e r m so ft r a d et ob et h er e l a t i v ep r i c eo fi m p o r t st oe x p o r t s ,
rather than the other way around.
114 Quantitative Assessment of the Eﬀects of Trade on Comovement
For each benchmark country pair, we simulate the model by varying transport costs between the
two countries in a range from zero to 35 percent. Each transport cost implies a particular steady-
state trade intensity.9 Given our benchmark Armington elasticity of 1.5, this range of transport
costs generates trade intensities that vary by a factor of four in each of our benchmark country
pairs, which is about one standard deviation from the median trade intensity in the data. In level
terms, the range in trade intensities generated by free trade and by transport costs of 35 percent is
0.002 for Australia-Belgium (low) and 0.007 for France-U.S. (high). For each transportation cost,
we simulate the model 1000 times over 35 years, and then apply the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter.10 We
calculate the average of the GDP correlations across all simulations.
Comparing across transport costs, we calculate the change in GDP correlation per unit change
in steady-state trade intensity. In other words, we undertake the model analogue of the regressions
from section 2. The model-generated “slope” is compared against the empirical estimates from
section 2.11
9An alternative approach to create variation in trade intensities is to vary the Armington aggregator weights
holding the transport costs constant. We have a slight preference for our approach as the transport costs can be
exogenous variables in our framework, while the Armington aggregator weights are parameters. However, in certain
settings, such as complete markets without capital accumulation, Betts and Kehoe (2001) show that these two
approaches are equivalent in the sense that for every calibration of non-zero transport costs, there exist Armington
weights at zero transport costs that “result in an equivalent model” (p. 26). In practice, there can be a diﬀerence
between the two approaches. For example, in a setting with two identical countries, ﬁnancial autarky, and free trade,
altering the Armington weights so that the import share declines from 0.30 to 0.15 implies a decrease in the GDP
correlation from 0.34 to 0.29. Setting the Armington weights so that the free trade import share is 0.30, and then
raising transport costs until the import share falls to 0.15 implies a decrease in the GDP correlation from 0.35 to
0.26. This example suggests that variation of transport costs could generate moderately greater implied slopes than
variation of the Armington weights.
10In an earlier version of this paper (Kose and Yi (2002)), we conducted simulations involving three identical coun-
tries. These simulations highlighted the eﬀects of diﬀerent asset markets, import shares, elasticities of substitution,
and country sizes. For some of the simulations, we also used a ﬁrst diﬀerence ﬁlter, as in Clark and van Wincoop
(2001). The trade-comovement implications were virtually identical to those generated by the HP ﬁlter.
11As a reminder, the exercises we undertake are cross-section exercises, not time series exercises. In particular,
they are designed to conform to the cross-section regressions of FR and others. For recent time series work on the
transmission of business cycles via international trade, see Prasad (2001) and Schmitt-Grohe (1998).
124.1 Main Results
In our baseline experiment, we examine the impact of trade on output comovement under complete
markets and ﬁnancial autarky. We then extend the analysis by lowering the Armington elasticity.
Last, we consider two additional transmission channels: 1) allowing for all transport costs, not just
transport costs between the two small countries, to change, and 2) allowing for the cross-country
correlation of productivity shocks to change as the transport costs change.
Baseline Experiment
In our ﬁrst and primary set of experiments, we ﬁx the transport costs between each small country
and the ROW at 15 percent. We then vary transport costs between the two small countries. Table
2 presents the bilateral trade intensities and GDP correlations under complete asset markets and
under international ﬁnancial autarky for 0 percent and 35 percent transport costs. Consider the
complete market results in the top panel of the table. For the Belgium-U.S. country pair, the trade
intensity increases by a factor of four, from 0.0013 to 0.005, as transport costs fall from 35 percent
to 0. Under complete markets, the GDP correlation rises from 0.323 to 0.329, an increase of 0.006.
The implied slope using the log of the trade intensity is 0.0043, which is less than 1/20 of our
estimated slope of 0.091 (log case) in Table 1. Consequently, with this benchmark country pair and
across these particular transport costs, the model explains only about 5 percent of the estimated
slope.
The complete markets results in the top panel also show that for the other benchmark country
pairs, even smaller results are obtained. For one country pair, Finland-Portugal, increased trade
is associated with essentially no change in GDP correlation. This is due to the two opposing
forces that operate under complete markets. On the one hand, greater trade linkages lead to more
“resource-shifting,” in which capital and other resources shift to the country receiving the favorable
productivity shock. All else equal, this resource-shifting force lowers business cycle comovement.
Second, there is a “trade-magniﬁcation” force: greater trade linkages leads to greater business
cycle comovement because, loosely speaking, of the usual supply and demand linkages mentioned
previously. From the tables we can infer that for the Finland-Portugal case, the two forces essentially
cancel.12
12Our ﬁnding that the model with complete asset markets can produce essentially no relationship between trade
intensity and business cycle comovement in the data is consistent with other research that has examined the eﬀects of
transport costs on comovement including BKK (1992), Zimmermann (1997), Kose and Yi (2001, 2002), and Mazzenga
and Ravn (2002). On the other hand, see Head (2002) for an international business cycle model based on monopolistic
13Under ﬁnancial autarky, the resource-shifting channel cannot operate, so the only force at work
is the trade-magniﬁcation force discussed above. Consequently, it is natural to suppose that the
model-implied slopes would be closer to the estimated slope. This is the case, as the right-hand
side of the top panel of Table 2 shows. For the Belgium-U.S. country pair, for example, the GDP
correlation rises from 0.3113 to 0.3247 as transport costs fall from 35 percent to 0, an increase of
0.0134. This increase is more than double the increase in the complete market case. The implied
slope, again using the log of the trade intensity, is 0.0098, which is slightly more than 1/10 of
our estimated slope. The implied slopes for the other three country pairs are all smaller than
the Belgium-U.S. slope. Relative to complete markets, the France-U.S. country pair showed the
greatest increase; the implied slope is about 5.6 percent of our estimated slope, which is 10 times
higher than under complete markets. Hence, while ﬁnancial autarky does generate higher implied
slopes than complete markets, the model is still oﬀ by an order of magnitude or more.13
While the primary goal of this section is to provide a quantitative assessment of the model, we
believe it is useful at this point to provide a more thorough intuition on how the trade-magniﬁcation
force works, especially because this is the force that generates greater comovement through increased
trade.14 One country’s GDP is correlated with another’s to the extent that its TFP, capital, and
labor are correlated with the other country’s TFP, capital, and labor. Capital is essentially ﬁxed in
the short run. The TFP processes are exogenous and remain unchanged in our baseline experiment.
Consequently, the increase in GDP correlation due to lower transport costs must stem primarily
from increases in the two countries’ employment correlation.
The employment correlation, in turn, is driven by TFP shocks. Consider a pair of countries. A
positive TFP shock to one country, “One,” will raise output of One’s intermediate good. Output of
the intermediate good rises further because employment in One rises. In addition, the relative price
of One’s intermediate good falls, i.e., One’s terms of trade increase. This makes labor in the other
country, “Two,” eﬀectively more productive, thus raising labor demand and employment in Two.
It turns out that the decrease in Two’s (increase in One’s) terms of trade is larger under free trade
than under transport costs. Hence, under free trade the employment and output response in Two
is larger, leading to greater output comovement with One. Figure 2 illustrates this for a special
competition. In this model, under complete markets, lower transport costs lead to higher output comovement.
13For both complete markets and ﬁnancial autarky, we calculated the model’s implied slope when transport costs
fall from 35 percent to 20 percent, from 20 percent to 10 percent and from 10 percent to 0. The results are essentially
the same. For example, for Belgium-U.S. under ﬁnancial autarky, the slopes are 0.005, 0.014, and 0.023, respectively.
14We thank one of the referees for suggesting much of the following intuition.
14case of our model in which all three countries are identical in size and in which the Armington
elasticity is 0.5.15
The last part of the intuition addresses why Two’s terms of trade fall by more under free trade
than under transport costs. There are two channels operating. The ﬁrst channel begins with the
idea that world demand for One’s good is the sum of One’s demand and Two’s demand. One’s
demand is less responsive to changes in prices (steeper demand curve) because any price changes
have both a substitution eﬀect and an income eﬀect. A positive TFP shock in One leads to a
decline in the price of its good. Demand rises because of substitution eﬀects, but this increase is
partially oﬀs e tb yt h ea d v e r s ei n c o m ee ﬀect owing to the worsened terms of trade. Two’s demand
for One’s good, on the other hand, is driven mainly by the substitution eﬀect. This means Two’s
demand curve is ﬂatter. As the world moves to free trade, Two’s share of world demand for One’s
good increases; this means the overall world demand curve becomes ﬂatter, which would lead to a
smaller fall in Two’s terms of trade.
The second channel works in the opposite direction. As the world moves toward free trade, the
importance of the income eﬀect for One’s response to its own productivity shocks rises. This is
because the income eﬀect is realized to the extent the country purchases imported goods. One’s
demand curve becomes steeper; this contributes to a steeper world demand curve, which, all else
equal, would lead to a steeper fall in Two’s terms of trade (in response to a positive TFP shock
in One). Our interpretation of the second panel of Figure 2 is that this second channel dominates
the ﬁrst channel. Summarizing, then, owing to composition of demand eﬀects, the terms of trade
response to a positive TFP shock is larger under free trade than under transport costs. This raises
the eﬀective marginal product of labor in the other country by more, leading to a greater increase
in employment and GDP and, hence, greater GDP comovement.
Returning to the quantitative analysis, a key reason for the small explanatory power of the
model is that the trade intensity for each of our benchmark country pairs is small to begin with. A
typical country does not trade much with any other country. This implies that a large percentage
increase in trade intensity may not be a large increase in trade intensity levels. In the Belgium-U.S.
case above, the increase in trade intensity by a factor of four translates into an increase in the
15We essentially employ a three-country, ﬁnancial autarky version of the model in Kose and Yi (2001). In particular,
the productivity shocks follow a vector AR(1) process with the diagonal elements equal to 0.717, and the oﬀ-diagonal
elements set to 0.033. The standard deviation of the error term is 0.013, and the error correlations are all 0.255. The
Armington weights are set so that the import share of GDP is 0.15 in steady state.
15trade intensity level of only 0.0037, or approximately 0.4 percent of GDP. Put diﬀerently, while a
log trade speciﬁcation may ﬁt the data well, as mentioned in section 2, it is diﬃcult to see how a
model would imply that an increase in trade intensity from 0.002 to 0.004 has the same eﬀect on
GDP comovement as an increase in trade intensity from 0.02 to 0.04. Indeed, drawing from the
Belgium-U.S. case under ﬁnancial autarky, the model-implied slopes when transport costs fall from
35 percent to 30 percent, from 20 percent to 15 percent and from 5 percent to 0, are 0.0026, 0.012,
and 0.026, respectively. At lower levels of transport costs, trade intensity levels are higher, so a
given percentage change in trade intensity translates into a larger absolute change; the fact that
the model-implied slope is 10 times higher when transport costs are around 5 percent compared
to when they are 35 percent indicates that the model is driven more by level changes, rather than
logarithmic changes, in trade intensity.
Hence, to put the model on a better footing, we calculate the change in GDP correlation per
unit change in the trade intensity level and compare that against our estimated coeﬃcient on the
level of trade intensity. We are, in a sense, controlling for the fact that for country pairs that trade
a small amount, large percentage increases in trade do not translate into large level increases. The
bottom panel of Table 2 presents the results from the “level” calculations for both complete markets
and ﬁnancial autarky. They show that the explanatory power of the model is indeed greater. For
example, with the Belgium-U.S. country pair and under ﬁnancial autarky, the model-implied slope
is 3.6, which is more than 1/4 of the estimated slope of 12.6, and more than double the explanatory
power calculated from the log slopes. Based on the logic above, it would be expected that the
country pairs with lower trade intensity would show a larger increase in explanatory power than
country pairs with higher trade intensity. Indeed, this is the case, as a comparison of Finland-
Portugal with France-U.S. illustrates.
Table 2 shows that the explanatory power of the model for the two benchmark country pairs
involving the U.S. is greater than for the two other benchmark country pairs, regardless of the
market structure and whether the log or level slopes are used. This is because a given increase in
trade intensity translates into a greater impact on the world economy the larger is the country pair.
(It is useful to recall that bilateral trade intensity is bilateral trade divided by the sum of the two
countries’ GDPs.) In general equilibrium, the greater impact on the world economy will eventually
be transmitted back to the two countries, generating greater comovement.
Nevertheless, even under ﬁnancial autarky and using the level slopes, it is still the case that
the best country pair, Belgium-U.S., explains less than 30 percent of the estimated slope. For the
16other three country pairs, the model still falls short by more than an order of magnitude.
Low Elasticity Experiment
Heathcote and Perri (2002) make a case that the Armington elasticity is less than 1. Lower
Armington elasticities make the countries’ intermediate goods behave more like complements and
less like substitutes, in the Armington aggregator. This would be expected to raise comovement,
as well as the responsiveness of comovement to changes in trade intensity. The latter would arise
to the extent that lower transport costs lead to larger terms of trade movement in response to a
TFP shock. Figure 3 illustrates the impulse response of the terms of trade and country 2’s output
for the same case as Figure 2, but with a high Armington elasticity, 3. A comparison of the two
ﬁgures shows that under a low Armington elasticity, the increase in the terms of a trade response
to a TFP shock in moving from 35 percent transport costs to free trade is larger than under a high
Armington elasticity.
We re-run our primary set of experiments with the elasticity Heathcote and Perri use, 0.9.
Table 3 reports the results under complete markets and ﬁnancial autarky, and computing both log
and level slopes. The table shows that using lower Armington elasticities does indeed improve the
ﬁt of the model; however, it still falls short for both market structures and even with the levels
slopes. Under complete markets, for example, the country pair with an implied levels slope closest
to the estimated levels slope is Belgium-U.S., but the model slope is only about 21 percent of
the estimated slope. For the other three country pairs, the model is still more than an order of
magnitude oﬀ. Under ﬁnancial autarky, the Belgium-U.S. simulation performs considerably better,
yielding an implied model levels slope that is 67 percent of the estimated levels slope. This is by far
the best ﬁt of all of our simulations. However, again, in the other three country pairs, the model
explains 25 percent or less of the empirical estimates.16
4.2 Two Additional Experiments
Our results suggest that the large gap between the model’s predictions and the empirical evidence is
certainly suggestive of a trade-comovement puzzle. However, in all of our experiments until now, we
have focused only on the channels directly linking bilateral trade to bilateral GDP correlations. In
16While the model performs relatively better with a low elasticity substitution, we note that such a low elasticity
is inconsistent with existing estimates — almost all of which are greater than our benchmark elasticity — and with
explaining large diﬀerences in trade across countries and over time. See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ (2001), and Yi (2003), for example. Hence, with respect to the volume of trade, the low elasticity is
counterfactual.
17this section, we report on two experiments designed to see if additional channels can help improve
the ﬁt to the data. The ﬁrst experiment examines a scenario in which all transport costs, not just
those involving the country pair in question, change. However, we attribute all of the increase in
GDP correlation only to trade between the country pair. The second experiment stems from the
fact that TFP correlation is closely related to bilateral trade intensity. In this experiment, we allow
for the correlation of TFP shocks to change when transport costs change.
All Transport Costs Change
Many of the European countries in our sample share the same trading partners. Also, for almost
all countries, the U.S. is an important trading partner. It is possible, then, that the GDP of two
small countries is highly correlated because both trade heavily with the U.S. and other countries.
This channel would complement the direct bilateral channel. If pairs of countries with higher
bilateral trade intensity also tend to trade extensively with common trading partners, then it is
possible that the empirical estimates of the eﬀect of trade on GDP correlation suﬀer from a positive
omitted variable bias.17 We assess the possibility that the empirical estimates are upwardly biased
by running simulations in which transport costs between all three countries change simultaneously
and by continuing to focus on the relationship between the two small countries’ bilateral trade
intensity and their GDP correlation. By doing so, we are essentially comparing pairs of countries
that trade heavily with each other and with the ROW to countries that trade little with each other
and with the ROW. As before, we calculate the change in GDP correlation between the two small
countries as the transport costs between them are varied, and compare that against what would be
predicted by the empirical estimates (based on the change in the country pair’s trade intensity).
Table 4 reports our results under ﬁnancial autarky.18 The panel shows clearly that when all
17If there is a bias, one way to rectify this would be to construct a bilateral measure of intensity of trade with
common trading partners and to re-estimate equation (1) including this variable in addition to the trade intensity
variable. However, it is likely that any such measure would be endogenous and would need to be instrumented for. It
is unclear what instruments would be correlated with this measure but uncorrelated with GDP comovement. Among
the cross-section and panel empirical papers, to our knowledge only Fidrmuc (2004) attempts to control for common
third-party trade. He enters a dummy variable for whether the pair of countries belongs to the EMU. He ﬁnds that
the EMU countries tend to have higher comovement, all else equal.
18Under complete markets the responsiveness of GDP correlation to decreases in transport costs is non-monotonic,
rising when transport costs are high, but then declining when transport costs are low. We infer that the resource-
shifting channel associated with complete markets is more important at lower transport costs. Three of our four
benchmark country pairs implied a negative relation between GDP comovement and trade (comparing free trade and
35% transport costs).
18transport costs decline simultaneously, the “explanatory” power of the model increases substan-
tially. Consider, for example, the Australia-Belgium benchmark case. Reducing all transport costs
from 35 percent to 0 raises the Australia-Belgium trade intensity from 0.00093 to 0.00248.19 The
lower transport costs raise the GDP correlation from 0.0939 to 0.1645. The implied log slope is
0.0716, which is 79 percent of our estimated slope of 0.091. Hence, compared to the baseline ex-
periment, the explanatory power of the model for this benchmark case has increased 90-fold! In
level terms, the model does even better. In fact, now the model does too well. The implied slope
of 45.4 is almost four times greater than the estimated slope. Compared to the baseline results,
the level slope improvement is also a factor of 90. While the Australia-Belgium case is the extreme
case among our four country pairs, the Belgium-U.S. and Finland-Portugal cases also generate level
slopes that are 70 percent or more of the estimated slope, and the Belgium-U.S. case generates a
log slope that is close to 50 percent of the estimated slope.
Comparing Table 4 with Table 2 also shows that the two benchmark cases with the largest
increase in slopes relative to the baseline experiment are the ones in which both countries in the
country pair are very small. The two benchmark cases that include the U.S. have considerably
less improvement. This is consistent with our previous discussion. For country pairs with very
small countries like Australia and Belgium or Finland and Portugal, our results suggest that what
matters for their GDP correlation is not so much their bilateral trade but their indirect trade, that
is, their trade with the rest of the world. For country pairs like Belgium and the U.S., because the
U.S. is such a large partner, increased trade with the ROW is less likely to make a diﬀerence for
the correlation of their GDPs.
We note that from the point of view of the existing empirical research, our experiment was an
extreme one, because in our model, all trade is with either the other country in the country pair or
with a common third country. Our results could be interpreted as the upper bound of what might
be estimated in a regression that does not control for this transmission channel. With this caveat,
our results suggest that it may be important for the empirical research to control for the intensity
of trade with common trading partners.
TFP Shock Correlation Changes as Transport Costs Change20
In our baseline experiments, we vary only transport costs and examine its eﬀect on GDP co-
19This is a smaller increase than in the ﬁrst experiment but is consistent with the insight from Anderson and
VanWincoop (2003) that bilateral trade ﬂows depend on barriers relative to other countries. If all barriers fall, the
increase in (bilateral) trade is less than what would occur if only bilateral barriers fell.
20We are grateful to one of the referees for suggesting the experiments in this section.
19movement. In particular, the correlation of TFP shocks is held ﬁxed. We do this to make our model
simulations conform to the conditions underlying the empirical research. Nevertheless, there may
be another source of omitted variable bias in that increased trade integration could be associated
with increased TFP correlation. Recent evidence from the trade and growth literature certainly
supports this idea, at least for data at lower frequencies.21 Moreover, our own data support this
idea too. We re-run the regressions from section 2, except we replace GDP correlation with TFP
correlation. The coeﬃcient in the levels regression is 13.08 (3.03).22 This is actually slightly larger
than the estimated coeﬃcient in the GDP correlation regressions.23 This suggests that increased
trade is indeed associated with increased TFP comovement or some force that looks like TFP
comovement.
We thus undertake an experiment in which, as transport costs decline, the correlation between
the TFP shocks in the two countries increases by an amount consistent with what is predicted by
the TFP regressions.24 By doing so, we are essentially comparing pairs of countries that trade
heavily with each other and have high TFP shock correlations against countries that trade little
with each other and have low TFP shock correlations. Consequently, as in the previous experiment,
there are two forces driving comovement: a direct eﬀect from higher trade and an indirect eﬀect
resulting from trade’s eﬀect on TFP shock correlations. As before, we also attribute all changes in
the GDP correlation to variation in trade intensity.
Table 5 presents the results for “level” slope case. Under both complete markets and ﬁnancial
autarky, the model performs much better. In all cases it explains at least 43 percent of the estimated
slopes. Under ﬁnancial autarky, and for the Belgium-U.S. country pair, the model explains 78
percent of the estimated slope. Comparing these results to the bottom panel of Table 2 shows
that including for this indirect TFP correlation channel provides a signiﬁcant boost in the model’s
ability to generate slopes close to those estimated in the data.
Hence, like the experiment considered above, this experiment provides an alternative explana-
tion for why the empirical regressions yield a much greater responsiveness of comovement to trade
21See Keller (2004) for a survey of international technology diﬀusion.
22The coeﬃcient in the logs regression is 0.089 and the standard error on the coeﬃcient is 0.017.
23We recognize that the apparent increase in TFP correlation associated with increased trade integration could
reﬂect forces such as variable factor utilization over the cycle. In this case, a more appropriate intepretation of our
measures of TFP are Solow residuals, which include both TFP and factor utilization.
24Speciﬁcally, the decline in transport costs implies an increase in steady-state trade. That increase in trade
is associated with a particular increase in TFP correlation, according to the regression estimates. We adjust the
correlation of the TFP shocks to produce that increase in the TFP correlation.
20than our baseline exercise. It suggests that both the empirical research and models might want to
take this additional channel into account.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we examine whether the standard international business cycle framework can quanti-
tatively replicate the results of recent empirical research that ﬁnds a positive association between
the extent of bilateral trade and output comovement. We employ a three-country business cycle
model in which changes in transportation costs induce an endogenous link between trade intensity
and output comovement. On the face of it, the model is expected to provide a good ﬁt, because it
embodies the key demand and supply-side spillover channels that are often invoked in explaining
the trade-induced transmission of business cycles. In particular, increased output in one country
leads to increased demand for the other country’s output. Following Heathcote and Perri (2002),
we study a model with international ﬁnancial autarky, as well as complete markets. Also, we cali-
brate our three-country model as closely as possible to the leading empirical paper in the literature,
Frankel and Rose (1998). The three-country aspect of the model is important, because it captures
the fact that most pairs of countries are small relative to the world.
We ﬁnd that the standard international business cycle model is able to capture the positive
relationship between trade and output comovement, but our baseline experiment falls far short of
explaining the magnitude of the empirical ﬁndings. This is true even when we control for the fact
that bilateral trade between countries is typically quite small as a share of GDP and relative to
a country’s total trade by computing level slopes, as opposed to the log slopes that are typically
estimated in the empirical research. Another reason for the model’s failure has to do with feedback
eﬀects from the country pair to the world economy and then back. Even country pairs with large
absolute changes in their bilateral trade share of GDP will not generate large feedback eﬀects if the
pair constitutes a small share of world GDP. In this sense, we have identiﬁed a trade-comovement
puzzle.
Our trade-comovement puzzle is diﬀerent from the six puzzles in international macroeconomics
that Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2001) identify. The two puzzles most closely related to ours are the
consumption correlations puzzle and the home-bias-in-trade puzzle. As discussed earlier, the con-
sumption correlations puzzle is a puzzle about levels and rankings of cross-country consumption
and output correlations. The home-bias-in-trade puzzle is about explaining low levels of trade. Our
21problem is about the responsiveness of output correlations to changes in bilateral trade. It is about
“slopes,” not levels, of correlations. We do not seek to explain the low levels of trade; rather, we
take these levels as given and ask how variation in them aﬀects output correlations.
We conduct two further experiments that might help explain the empirical ﬁndings. In one
experiment, we vary all transport costs, not just those between the country pair, but we attribute
all of the correlation changes to change in the country pair’s bilateral trade. This experiment
allows us to obtain a slope that is closer to, and in some cases, exceeds, the estimated slopes. This
suggests that the empirical research might beneﬁt from controlling for intensity of third-party trade.
In addition, we conduct an experiment in which as transport costs decline, and trade increases, the
correlation of TFP shocks increases, as well. With two channels aﬀecting GDP correlation, the pure
trade channel and an indirect channel operating through TFP comovement, it is not surprising that
the model does a much better job in this experiment. Both of these experiments suggest additional
control variables for the empirical research. Our empirical ﬁnding that TFP comovement is strongly
positively associated with trade suggests a puzzle for model builders, as well. We leave this for
future research.
In their empirical work, FR do not control for variables other than bilateral trade intensity.
Other researchers, especially Imbs (2004), contend that controlling for sectoral similarity in the re-
gressions leads to smaller coeﬃcients on trade. However, Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004), Calderon,
Chong, and Stein (2002), Clark and van Wincoop (2001), and Otto, Voss, and Willard (2001) also
control for industrial or sectoral similarity (among other variables) and the coeﬃcients on trade
are still statistically signiﬁcant. An additional empirical ﬁnding is that intra-industry trade is
more important than inter-industry trade or total trade in driving GDP comovement.25 We would
suggest addressing the importance of these sectoral issues from the lens of a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model. Indeed, there are models that include multiple sectors, including those
by Kouparitsas (1998) and Ambler, Cardia, and Zimmermann (2002). Also, Burstein, Kurz, and
Tesar (2004) implement a version of a multiple-sector model with production sharing. A further
extension would be to replace the Armington aggregator in these models, in which specialization
patterns are invariant to changing trade costs, with neoclassical trade theory, in which specialization
25See, for example, Fidrmuc (2004) and Gruben, Koo and Millis (2002). Allowing for increased specialization poses
a double-edged sword, however. To the extent that it generates less industrial similarity across countries, and to the
extent that industry-speciﬁc shocks are important drivers of the business cycle, increased specialization could reduce
output comovement.
22patterns can endogenously change when trade costs change.
A Appendix: Productivity Shock Process and Import Shares
A.1 Estimating Productivity Shock Process
Our raw data for computing the productivity shocks come from the Penn World Tables, version
6.0. For the period 1970-1998, we obtain data on population, real GDP (chained), and real GDP
per worker for the 21 countries in our sample. For each simulation involving a particular country
pair, we calculate three sets of Solow residuals. The ﬁrst two sets correspond to the two countries
in the country pair. The third set corresponds to the other 19 countries, which serve as the rest
of the world (ROW). Output and labor are summed across countries to yield an ROW aggregate.
The Solow residuals are constructed as follows:
Zit =l n ( Yit) − 0.64ln(Lit) (20)
where Yit is real GDP for country i in year t,a n dLit is the number of workers in country i in year
t.O u r c o e ﬃcient on labor corresponds to the labor share of output used by BKK, for example.
The capital stock data in the latest Penn World Tables are currently not available.
With the three sets of Solow residuals, we estimate an AR1 productivity shock matrix A.W e
regress each set of residuals on a constant, a time trend, and lagged values of each of the three
residuals. This yields the A matrices listed in Appendix Table 1. The standard deviations and
correlation matrix of the residuals are used to construct the variance-covariance matrix V of the
residuals; these values are also listed in Appendix Table 1.
A.2 Calculating Import Shares
We calibrate the Armington aggregator parameters so that under transportation costs of 15 percent
the implied steady-state import shares match the actual import shares, and intermediate goods
output equals ﬁnal goods output.26 Speciﬁcally, for each set of three countries (the speciﬁed
country pair and the rest of the world), there are nine aggregator parameters to set. We use two
ﬁrst order conditions from ﬁnal goods ﬁrm j0s maximization problem (six equations in total), where
26In Kose and Yi (2002), we calibrated the aggregator parameters so that the steady-state import shares match
the actual import shares under free trade. The results are virtually identical.













We also set intermediate goods output equal to ﬁnal goods output, as in Backus, Kehoe, and
Kydland (1992) (three equations), to determine the nine parameters. These nine equations must
be solved along with the other steady-state equations of the model.
We follow Zimmermann (1997) by calculating the import shares, e.g.
pijmij
yj , for each trading
partner of each of the three countries. This is complicated by the fact that imports by ROW
countries from other ROW countries are redundant or internal trade in our framework and need
to be subtracted from the raw imports data. Then, for each country, we divide the import share
of GDP (with ROW imports appropriately adjusted) among the two other countries according to
their share in the country’s imports from these two countries. Imports from the own country are
deﬁned as 1- import share of GDP (again, with ROW imports appropriately adjusted).
References
[1] Ambler, Steve; Cardia, Emanuela and Christian Zimmerman. “International Transmission of
the Business Cycle in a Multi-Sector Model.” European Economic Review, 2002, 46, pp. 273-
300.
[2] Anderson, Heather; Kwark, Noh Sun, and Farhid Vashid. “Does International Trade Syn-
chronize Business Cycles?” manuscript, Monash University and Texas A&M University, July
1999.
[3] Anderson, James and van Wincoop, Eric. “Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border
Puzzle.” American Economic Review, March 2003, 93, pp. 170-192.
[4] Backus, David K.; Kehoe, Patrick J. and Finn E. Kydland. “International Real Business
Cycles.” Journal of Political Economy, August 1992, 100 (4), pp. 745-775.
[5] ____________. “Dynamics of the Trade Balance and the Terms of Trade: The J-
Curve?” American Economic Review, March 1994, 84 (1), pp. 84-103.
[6] Baier, Scott L. and Bergstrand, Jeﬀrey H. “The Growth of World Trade: Tariﬀs, Transport
Costs, and Income Similarity.” Journal of International Economics, February 2001, 53, pp.
1-27.
24[7] Baxter, Marianne and Crucini, Mario J. “Business Cycles and the Asset Structure of Foreign
Trade.” International Economic Review, November 1995, 36 (4), pp. 821-54.
[8] Baxter, Marianne and Kouparitsas, Michael. “Determinants of Business Cycle Comovement:
A Robust Analysis.” NBER Working Paper 10725, August 2004.
[9] Betts, Caroline M. and Kehoe, Timothy J. “Tradability of Goods and Real Exchange Rate
Fluctuations.” Manuscript, University of Southern California and University of Minnesota,
2001.
[10] Burstein, Ariel; Kurz, Christopher Johann, and Linda Tesar. “Trade, Production Sharing,
and the International Transmission of Business Cycles.” Manuscript, UCLA and University of
Michigan, November 2004.
[11] Calderon, Cesar A.; Chong, Alberto E., and Ernesto H. Stein.“Trade Intensity and Business
Cycle Synchronization: Are Developing Countries Any Diﬀerent?” Manuscript, Inter-American
Development Bank, March 2002.
[12] Canova, Fabio, and Dellas, Harris. “Trade Interdependence and the International Business
Cycle.” Journal of International Economics, 1993, 34, pp. 23-47.
[13] Clark, Todd E., and van Wincoop, Eric. “Borders and Business Cycles.” Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, 2001, 55, pp. 59-85.
[14] Fidrmuc, Jarko. “The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria, Intra-Industry
Trade, and EMU Enlargement.” Contemporary Economic Policy, January 2004, 22 (1), 1-12..
[15] Frankel, Jeﬀrey A. and Rose, Andrew K. “The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area
Criteria.” Economic Journal, July 1998, 108, pp. 1009-1025.
[16] Gruben, William C.; Koo, Jahyeong, and Eric Millis. “Does International Trade Aﬀect Business
Cycle Synchronization?”, Manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, November 2002.
[17] Head, Allen. “Aggregate Fluctuations with National and International Returns to Scale.”
International Economic Review, November 2002, 43 (4), pp. 1101-1125.
[18] Heathcote, Jonathan and Perri, Fabrizio. “Financial Autarky and International Business Cy-
cles.” Journal of Monetary Economics, April 2002, 49 (3), pp. 601-628.
25[19] Heston, Alan; Summers, Robert and Bettina Aten. Penn World Table Version 6.0, Center for
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), December 2001.
[20] Hummels, David. “Have International Transport Costs Declined?” Manuscript. University of
Chicago, 1999.
[21] Hummels, David; Ishii, Jun and Kei-Mu Yi. “The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization
in World Trade.” Journal of International Economics, June 2001, 54, pp. 75-96.
[22] Imbs, Jean. “Trade, Finance, Specialization, and Synchronization.” Review of Economics and
Statistics, August 2004, 86 (3), 723-734.
[23] Keller, Wolfgang. “International Technology Diﬀusion.” Journal of Economic Literature, Sep-
tember 2004, 42 (3), 752-782.
[24] Kose, M. Ayhan, and Yi, Kei-Mu. “International Trade and Business Cycles: Is Vertical
Specialization the Missing Link?” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol:
91, 371-375, 2001.
[25] Kose, M. Ayhan, and Yi, Kei-Mu. “The Trade-Comovement Problem in International Macro-
economics.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staﬀ Report #155, December 2002.
[26] Kouparitsas, Michael. “North-South Business Cycles.” Manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, April 1998.
[27] Mazzenga, Elisabetta and Ravn, Morton O. “International Business Cycles: The Quantitative
Role of Transportation Costs.” Journal of International Money and Finance 23, August 2004,
645-71.
[28] Obstfeld, Maurice and Rogoﬀ, Kenneth. “The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeco-
nomics: Is There a Common Cause?” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, 2001, 339-389.
[29] Otto, Glenn; Voss, Graham and Luke Willard. “Understanding OECD Output Correlations.”
RDP 2001-05, Reserve Bank of Australia, 2001.
[30] Prasad, Eswar S. “International Trade and the Business Cycle.” Economic Journal, October
2001, 109, pp. 588-606.
26[31] Ravn, Morton O. and Mazzenga, Elisabetta. “Frictions in International Trade and Relative
Price Movements.” Manuscript, London Business School, 1999.
[32] Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie. “The International Transmission of Economic Fluctuations: Eﬀects
of U.S. Business Cycles on the Canadian Economy”. Journal of International Economics, 1998,
44, pp. 257-287.
[33] Yi, Kei-Mu. “Can Vertical Specialization Explain the Growth of World Trade?”, Journal of
Political Economy, February 2003, 52-102.
[34] Zimmermann, Christian. “International Real Business Cycles Among Heterogeneous Coun-
tries.” European Economic Review, 1997, 41, pp. 319-355.















-9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
(log) Bilateral Trade Intensity
HP Filtered GDP 
Correlation 
 
Figure 2: Impulse Response to Productivity Shock in Country 1,  







































































































































Figure 3: Impulse Response to Productivity Shock in Country 1,  
International Financial Autarky, High Elasticity Case (3) 










































































































































EMPIRICAL LINK BETWEEN TRADE AND BUSINESS CYCLE COMOVEMENT
1a. Descriptive Statistics 
Bilateral HP-filtered GDP  Log first-differenced
Trade Intensity correlation GDP correlation
Median 0.0023 0.42 0.34
Minimum 0.0002 -0.57 -0.32
Maximum 0.0727 0.93 0.83
Standard deviation 0.0098 0.35 0.22
1b. Estimation Results (Updated Frankel-Rose Regressions)
Coefficient on Trade Intensity
Logs Levels
HP-filtered GDP                       0.091 (.022) 12.557 (3.760)
Log first-differenced GDP       0.078 (.014) 11.262 (2.859)
1c. Trade and Comovement Properties of  Benchmark Country Pairs
Bilateral HP-filtered GDP  Log first-differenced
Country Pair Trade Intensity correlation GDP correlation
Belgium-US 0.0019 0.403 0.359
Australia-Belgium 0.0015 0.442 0.363
Finland-Portugal 0.0017 0.452 0.377
France-U.S. 0.0040 0.434 0.363
Note: Annual GDP and trade data for 21 OECD countries, 1970-2000, is from IMF's International Financial Statistics 
and Direction of Trade Statistics. Bilateral trade intensity is sum of imports divided by sum of GDPs, averaged over 
1970-2000. GMM estimation of GDP correlation on a constant and log or level of trade intensity. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Instrumental variables for trade intensity are log of distance, adjacency dummy, and common 
language, and are obtained from Andrew Rose's web site: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htmTABLE 2
QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTS OF TRADE ON GDP CO-MOVEMENT
Baseline Experiment
Implied slopes based on log of trade intensity Estimated slope=0.091
COMPLETE MARKETS FINANCIAL AUTARKY
Benchmark Transport Trade GDP Implied  Implied slope/ GDP Implied  Implied slope/
Country-Pair Costs Intensity Correlation slope Estimated Slope Correlation slope Estimated Slope
(percent) (percent)
Belgium U.S. 35% 0.00127 0.3235 0.3113
0% 0.00500 0.3294 0.0043 4.7% 0.3247 0.0098 10.8%
Australia Belgium 35% 0.00073 0.1450 0.1339
0% 0.00286 0.1456 0.0005 0.5% 0.1350 0.0008 0.9%
Finland Portugal 35% 0.00084 0.2506 0.2859
0% 0.00331 0.2505 -4.9E-05 -0.1% 0.2870 0.0008 0.9%
France U.S. 35% 0.00249 0.3419 0.3486
0% 0.00974 0.3425 0.0004 0.5% 0.3555 0.0051 5.6%
Implied slopes based on level of trade intensity Estimated slope=12.557
COMPLETE MARKETS FINANCIAL AUTARKY
Benchmark Transport Trade GDP Implied  Implied slope / GDP Implied Implied slope/
Country-Pair Costs Intensity Correlation Slope Estimate Slope Correlation Slope Estimated Slope
(percent) (percent)
Belgium U.S. 35% 0.00127 0.3235 0.3113
0% 0.00500 0.3294 1.576 12.6% 0.3247 3.601 28.7%
Australia Belgium 35% 0.00073 0.1450 0.1339
0% 0.00286 0.1456 0.293 2.3% 0.1350 0.527 4.2%
Finland Portugal 35% 0.00084 0.2506 0.2859
0% 0.00331 0.2505 -0.027 -0.2% 0.2870 0.441 3.5%
France U.S. 35% 0.00249 0.3419 0.3486
0% 0.00974 0.3425 0.079 0.6% 0.3555 0.957 7.6%
Note: Implied slope in logs (levels) is calculated as change in GDP correlation per unit log (level) change in trade intensity (between 35% and 0% transport costs)TABLE 3
QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTS OF TRADE ON GDP CO-MOVEMENT
Low Elasticity Experiment
LOG Slopes Estimated slope=0.091
COMPLETE MARKETS FINANCIAL AUTARKY
Benchmark Transport Trade GDP Implied Implied slope/ GDP Implied  Implied slope/
Country-Pair Costs Intensity Correlation slope Estimated slope Correlation slope Estimated slope
(percent) (percent)
Belgium U.S. 35% 0.00211 0.3607 0.3513
0% 0.00404 0.3658 0.0080 8.8% 0.3676 0.0251 27.5%
Australia Belgium 35% 0.00121 0.1886 0.1852
0% 0.00231 0.1893 0.0011 1.2% 0.1865 0.0020 2.2%
Finland Portugal 35% 0.00140 0.2881 0.3056
0% 0.00268 0.2893 0.0019 2.0% 0.3067 0.0017 1.8%
France U.S. 35% 0.00412 0.3579 0.3685
0% 0.00789 0.3603 0.0038 4.2% 0.3792 0.0164 18.0%
LEVEL Slopes  Estimated slope=12.557
COMPLETE MARKETS FINANCIAL AUTARKY
Benchmark Transport Trade GDP Implied  Implied slope/ GDP Implied Implied slope/
Country-Pair Costs Intensity Correlation slope Estimated slope Correlation Slope Estimated slope
(percent) (percent)
Belgium U.S. 35% 0.00211 0.3607 0.3513
0% 0.00404 0.3658 2.681 21.4% 0.3676 8.438 67.2%
Australia Belgium 35% 0.00121 0.1886 0.1852
0% 0.00231 0.1893 0.642 5.1% 0.1865 1.173 9.3%
Finland Portugal 35% 0.00140 0.2881 0.3056
0% 0.00268 0.2893 0.941 7.5% 0.3067 0.841 6.7%
France U.S. 35% 0.00412 0.3579 0.3685
0% 0.00789 0.3603 0.652 5.2% 0.3792 2.827 22.5%
Note: Implied slope in logs (levels) is calculated as change in GDP correlation per unit log (level) change in trade intensity (between 35% and 0% transport costs)TABLE 4
QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTS OF TRADE ON GDP CO-MOVEMENT
All Transport Costs Change
FINANCIAL AUTARKY Log Slopes Level Slopes
Estimated slope= Estimated slope=
0.091 12.557
Benchmark Transport Trade GDP Implied  Implied slope/ Implied  Implied slope/
Country-Pair Costs Intensity Correlation slope Estimated slope slope Estimated slope
(percent) (percent)
Belgium U.S. 35% 0.00135 0.2833
0% 0.00478 0.3396 0.0447 49.1% 16.45 131.0%
Australia Belgium 35% 0.00093 0.0939
0% 0.00248 0.1645 0.0716 78.7% 45.40 361.6%
Finland Portugal 35% 0.00101 0.2770
0% 0.00297 0.2950 0.0166 18.3% 9.18 73.1%
France U.S. 35% 0.00265 0.3415
0% 0.00934 0.3640 0.0178 19.6% 3.36 26.8%
Note: Implied slope in logs (levels) is calculated as change in GDP correlation per unit log (level) change in trade intensity TABLE 5
QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTS OF TRADE ON GDP CO-MOVEMENT
TFP correlations change
COMPLETE MARKETS Level Slopes
Estimated slope=
12.557
Benchmark Transport Trade GDP Implied Implied  slope/
Country-Pair Costs Intensity Correlation slope Estimated slope
(percent)
Belgium U.S. 35% 0.00127 0.3235
0% 0.00500 0.3533 7.99 63.6%
Australia Belgium 35% 0.00073 0.1450
0% 0.00286 0.1565 5.39 43.0%
Finland Portugal 35% 0.00084 0.2506
0% 0.00331 0.2679 7.01 55.8%
France U.S. 35% 0.00249 0.3419
0% 0.00974 0.3900 6.64 52.9%
FINANCIAL AUTARKY Level Slopes
Estimated slope=
12.557
Benchmark Transport Trade GDP Implied Implied  slope/
Country-Pair Costs Intensity Correlation slope Estimated slope
(percent)
Belgium U.S. 35% 0.00127 0.3113
0% 0.00500 0.3479 9.82 78.2%
Australia Belgium 35% 0.00073 0.1336
0% 0.00286 0.1456 5.59 44.5%
Finland Portugal 35% 0.00084 0.2859
0% 0.00331 0.3040 7.30 58.1%
France U.S. 35% 0.00249 0.3486
0% 0.00974 0.4016 7.32 58.3%
Note: Implied slope in logs (levels) is calculated as change in GDP correlation per unit log (level) change in trade intensity APPENDIX TABLE 1
ESTIMATED PRODUCTIVITY SHOCK PROCESS AND IMPORT SHARES 
Belgium U.S. Australia Belgium Finland Portugal France U.S.
A Matrix (Matrix of AR1 Productivity Shocks) A Matrix (Matrix of AR1 Productivity Shocks) A Matrix (Matrix of AR1 Productivity Shocks) A Matrix (Matrix of AR1 Productivity Shock
Belgium U.S. ROW Australia Belgium ROW Finland Portugal ROW France U.S. ROW
Belgium 0.513 0.352 0.074 Austral. 0.731 -0.143 -0.317 Finland 0.669 -0.189 0.396 France 0.581 0.241 0.020
U.S. -0.168 0.823 -0.464 Belgium 0.197 0.436 0.421 Portugal -0.244 0.562 1.018 U.S. -0.296 0.762 -0.293
ROW -0.252 0.197 0.771 ROW 0.108 -0.303 0.783 ROW -0.071 -0.133 0.829 ROW 0.025 0.268 0.432
Standard Deviation of Residuals Standard Deviation of Residuals Standard Deviation of Residuals Standard Deviation of Residuals
Belgium U.S. ROW Australia Belgium ROW Finland Portugal ROW France U.S. ROW
0.016 0.018 0.011 0.018 0.016 0.013 0.031 0.029 0.013 0.012 0.018 0.012
Correlation of Residuals Correlation of Residuals Correlation of Residuals Correlation of Residuals
Belgium U.S. ROW Australia Belgium ROW Finland Portugal ROW France U.S. ROW
Belgium Austral. Finland France
U.S. 0.368 Belgium 0.248 Portugal 0.125 U.S. 0.438
ROW 0.577 0.684 ROW 0.461 0.516 ROW 0.339 0.496 ROW 0.670 0.694
Matrix of Import Shares Matrix of Import Shares Matrix of Import Shares Matrix of Import Shares
To \ From Belgium U.S. ROW To \ From Australia Belgium ROW To \ From Finland Portugal ROW To \ From France U.S. ROW
Belgium 0.359 0.047 0.594 Austral. 0.830 0.002 0.168 Finland 0.721 0.003 0.277 France 0.792 0.022 0.186
U.S. 0.002 0.899 0.099 Belgium 0.003 0.359 0.638 Portugal 0.002 0.649 0.349 U.S. 0.004 0.899 0.097
ROW 0.024 0.074 0.901 ROW 0.014 0.047 0.940 ROW 0.035 0.019 0.946 ROW 0.038 0.072 0.890
Note: Data sources include Penn World Tables, version 6.0; and the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics